University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Winter 1987

Article 10

1987

Casenotes: Debtor-Creditor Relations —
Garnishment — Garnishee Who Enters into a
Bona Fide Pregarnishment Contract with a Debtor
Does Not Have Possession of Debtor's Property
and Is Not Liable for Fees Received by Debtor.
Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68,
516 A.2d 596 (1986)
James E. Urmin
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Urmin, James E. (1987) "Casenotes: Debtor-Creditor Relations — Garnishment — Garnishee Who Enters into a Bona Fide
Pregarnishment Contract with a Debtor Does Not Have Possession of Debtor's Property and Is Not Liable for Fees Received by
Debtor. Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 516 A.2d 596 (1986)," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 2,
Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol16/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS -

GARNISHMENT -

GAR-

NISHEE WHO ENTERS INTO A BONA FIDE PREGARNISHMENT CONTRACT WITH A DEBTOR DOES NOT HAVE
POSSESSION OF DEBTOR'S PROPERTY AND IS NOT LIABLE
FOR FEES RECEIVED BY DEBTOR. Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage
Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 516 A.2d 596 (1986).
An attorney, specializing in collection work, entered into a contract
with a doctor for the collection of the doctor's overdue accounts. ' Pursuant to the contract, the attorney retained fifty percent of the amounts he
collected and forwarded the remainder to the doctor. Subsequently, the
attorney fell in debt and the attorney's judgment creditors 2 filed a writ of
garnishment directed toward the doctor for the money received from the
attorney. 3 The doctor denied owing any debt to the attorney4 or possess1. Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 69, 516 A.2d 596, 597 (1986).
2. Merchants Mortgage Co. v. Lubow, No. A-50134 (Md. B.C.C. Oct. 10, 1978) (order
charging attorney as judgment debtor of Merchants Mortgage Co.).
3. Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 69, 516 A.2d at 597. The garnishment proceeding was instituted pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-645 which reads in part:
(a) Availability. - This Rule governs garnishment of any property of the
judgment debtor, other than wages subject to Rule 2-646 and a partnership interest subject to a charging order, in the hands of a third person for
the purpose of satisfying a money judgment. Property includes any debt
owed to the judgment debtor, whether immediately payable, unmatured,
or contingent.
(b) Issuance of Writ. - The judgment creditor may obtain issuance of a
writ of garnishment by filing in the same action in which the judgment was
entered a request that contains (1) the caption of the action, (2) the
amount owed under the judgment, (3) the name and last known address of
the judgment debtor, and (4) the name and address of the garnishee.
Upon the filing of the request, the clerk shall issue a writ of garnishment
directed to the garnishee.
(c) Content. - The writ of garnishment shall:
(1) contain the information in the request, the name and address
of the person requesting the writ, and the date of issue,
(2) direct the garnishee to hold the property of the judgment
debtor subject to further proceedings,
(3) notify the garnishee of the time within which the answer
must be filed and that failure to do so may result in judgment by
default against the garnishee,
(4) notify the judgment debtor and garnishee that federal and
state exemptions may be available,
(5) notify the judgment debtor of the right to contest the garnishment by filing a motion asserting a defense or objection.
MD. R. 2-645.

4. Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 69-70, 516 A.2d at 597. The doctor answered pursuant to
Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-645(e), which reads:
Answer of Garnishee. - The garnishee shall file an answer within the time
provided by Rule 2-321. The answer shall admit or deny that the garnishee is indebted to the judgment debtor or has possession of property of
the judgment debtor and shall specify the amount and nature of any debt
and describe any property. The garnishee may assert any defense that the
garnishee may have to the garnishment, as well as any defense that the
judgment debtor could assert. After answering, the garnishee may pay
any garnished indebtedness into court and may deliver to the sheriff any
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ing any property belonging to the attorney. 5
After the attorney filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, 6 the
7
judgment creditor commenced an original action against the doctor.
The judgment creditor alleged that it was entitled to recover from the
doctor the amount of contingency fees received by the attorney between
the date the garnishment writ was served and the date the attorney filed
for bankruptcy. 8 The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City
granted summary judgment for the judgment creditor, 9 reasoning that,
because possession by the agent is equivalent to possession by the principal, payment to the creditor's authorized agent - the attorney - was
equivalent to direct payment to the creditor - the doctor.' 0 The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that, by the terms of
the pregarnishment contract, the doctor possessed no property belonging
to the attorney; therefore, the creditor was foreclosed from recovery

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

garnished property, which shall then be treated as if levied upon by the
sheriff.
MD. R. 2-645(e).
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 69-70, 516 A.2d at 597.
See In re Eugene J. Silverman, Case No. 85-0334 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 1985).
Neither the attorney, Silverman, nor the trustee in bankruptcy participated in the
judgment creditor's garnishment action against the doctor. Cocco, 69 Md. App. at
70, 516 A.2d at 597.
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 70, 516 A.2d at 597. The judgment creditor commenced an
original action against the doctor pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-645(g)
which reads:
When Answer Filed. - If the garnishee files a timely answer, the matters
set forth in the answer shall be treated as established for the purpose of the
garnishment proceeding unless the judgment creditor files a reply contesting the answer within 30 days after its filing. If a timely reply is not
filed, the court may enter judgment upon request of the judgment creditor,
the judgment debtor, or the garnishee. If a timely reply is filed to the
answer of the garnishee, the matter shall proceed as if it were an original
action between the judgment creditor as plaintiff and the garnishee as defendant and shall be governed by the rules applicable to civil actions.
MD. R. 2-645(g).
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 70, 516 A.2d at 597. The claimed fees amounted to
$3,645.84. Id.
See Merchants Mortgage Co. v. Cocco, No. A-50134 (Md. B.C.C. June 3, 1986)
(order without opinion). The trial judge, Judge J. Kaplan, found that there were no
factual differences between this case and an earlier case, Merchants Mortgage Co. v.
Lubow, No. A-50134 (Md. B.C.C. July 10, 1985), in which liability was imposed
upon the garnishee. Thus, Judge Kaplan expressly reaffirmed his ruling in the earlier controversy. The parties, therefore, regarded Judge Kaplan's Memorandum
Opinion and Order of July 10, 1985, as providing the basis for the judgment in this
case and agreed to so stipulate, as authorized by Maryland Rule of Procedure
1026(e): "[T]he parties with the approval of the lower court may prepare and sign a
statement of the case showing how the questions arose and were decided, and setting
forth so much only of the facts.., as is essential to a decision of such questions by
this Court." Parties' Joint Statement of the Case at 3-4, Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 516 A.2d 596 (1986) (No. 703).
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 70-71, 516 A.2d at 597.
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against the doctor."
Attachment refers to any seizure of property by a debtor's creditor
for the purpose of bringing it within the custody of the court. 12 Garnishment is a type of attachment whereby property owed to a debtor by a
third party may be reached by the debtor's creditor, even though it is
possessed by a third party.' 3 The third party is styled a "garnishee" bell. Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 73-74, 516 A.2d 596, 599
(1986).
12. See In re Safady Bros., 228 F. 538, 541 (W.D. Wis. 1915).
Attachment proceedings have their origin in early English common law. C.
DRAKE, SUITS BY ATTACHMENT § 1, at I (2d ed. 1858). The origin of attachments
in England has been ascribed to Roman law. Id. The custom of attachment was
brought to the United States and incorporated into the legal system of every state by
practical necessity. Id. at 6.
The division of our extended domain into many different States, each sovereign within its territory, ... the absence of a general Bankrupt Law, and
the prevalent abolishment of imprisonment for debt ...

naturally, and of

necessity, [led] to the establishment, and . . . the enlargement and extension, of remedies acting upon the property of debtors.
Id. For examples of state attachment statutes, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 482.010 - 493.060 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-501 to 584 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 6021-6226 (Consol. 19831984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2741-2838 (Purdon 1969).
Attachment accomplishes the dual purpose of compelling the defendant's appearance in court as well as providing the plaintiff with security for the payment of
his claim as creditor if it is established as being due. State v. Friedman, 283 Md.
701, 706, 393 A.2d 1356, 1359 (1978). A writ of attachment is accompanied or
preceded by a summons that is served upon the debtor if practicable; if not, the
debtor is notified by publication of the attachment. C. DRAKE, supra, § 1, at 8.
The most material differences [from English law] as it exists among us
[today] are the necessity of notice to the defendant, either actual or constructive; the direct action of the attachment on tangible property, as well
as its indirect effect upon debts, and upon property in the garnishee's
hands; the necessity for the presentation of special grounds for resort to it;
and the requirement of a cautionary bond, to be executed by the plaintiff
and sureties, to indemnify the defendant against damage resulting from
the attachment.
Id. § 1, at 7-8. In England, the only notice to the debtor is that derived through the
attachment of his property. Id. § 1, at 8.
An attachment is directed against property of the principal debtor that is in his
possession or under his control. Craig v. Barber Bros. Contracting Co., 190 Miss.
182, 199 S. 270 (1940). An attachment may issue against any property or credit
belonging to the debtor, whether matured or unmatured. Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Washington County Nat'l Say. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 697, 467 A.2d 758, 762 (1983)
("[A]n attachable 'credit' is a monetary obligation that the garnishee owes the
debtor."); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (1984) ("An attachment
may be issued against any property or credit, matured or unmatured, which belong
to a debtor.").
Nevertheless, the debtor must have some right or title, legal or equitable, in the
property. First Nat'l Bank v. Jaggers, 31 Md. 38 (1869); Wanex v. Provident State
Bank, 53 Md. App. 409, 454 A.2d 381 (1983). In Maryland, once there is a judgment on the debt, assets in the hands of a third person can be attached by the
judgment creditor. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267
Md. 378, 385, 298 A.2d 1, 6 (1972).
13. C. DRAKE, supra note 12, § 450, at 349.
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cause he is garnished, that is, warned not to deliver the property owed to
the debtor, but to appear and answer the creditor's suit. l4

Generally,

garnishment is applicable where a third party owes the debtor either
money or property and that debt is legally enforceable between the third
party and the debtor. 15

Garnishment subrogates the debtor's creditor to whatever rights the
debtor may have against the garnishee.' 6 Thus, a creditor's rights
against the garnishee depend upon the existing rights between the garnishee and the debtor. 17 When the garnishee is served with the writ of
garnishment,' 8 the creditor acquires the same rights to the same extent as
14. Id. § 451, at 349.
15. See Craig v. Barber Bros. Contracting Co., 190 Miss. 182, 188-89, 199 So. 270, 272
(1940).
16. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 300, 129 A. 660,
664 (1925); Farley v. Colver, 113 Md. 379, 385, 77 A. 589, 592 (1910).
17. See, e.g., Zink v. Black Star Line, Inc., 57 App. D.C. 114, 18 F.2d 156, cert. denied,
275 U.S. 527 (1927); Smith v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 832, 314 P.2d 237, 239 (1957); Smith v. Amherst Acres, Inc., 43 A.D.2d
792, 350 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1973); Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22, 332 A.2d 821
(1974). Accord Farley, 113 Md. at 385, 77 A. at 591 ("The general rule is well settled
in this State that the rights of the attaching creditor to recover against the garnishee
depends upon the subsisting rights between the garnishee and the debtor in the attachment ....").
Because the garnishee cannot be placed in a worse position than if he had been
sued by the debtor, the condemnation is subject to any right of set-off or discharge
existing at the time of garnishment that would be available to the garnishee if he
were sued by the debtor. Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 507-08, 224
A.2d 419, 421-22 (1966). The garnishee may avail himself of such a set-off even
where the debtor's obligation is not due at the time of attachment, provided it becomes due before trial. Id. at 508, 224 A.2d at 422. In a dissenting opinion in
Messall, Judge Barnes addressed Maryland's unique position in permitting set-offs
on debts that mature prior to trial:
[T]he holding that the garnishee may, in the absence of the debtor's insolvency or fraud or other special circumstance, set off an indebtedness which
was in existence but unmatured when the writ was served but which becomes due before trial, is unique to Maryland. An examination of cases
throughout the United States indicates this, although there are a few cases
which have given the right of set-off if the time of maturity occurs prior to
filing of a plea or answer by the garnishee. An Illinois statute expressly
permits a garnishee to set off demands whether "due at the time of service
of the garnishment summons or thereafter to become due" .....
All of the other jurisdictions hold that the set-off may only be made
by the garnishee if the obligation of the debtor is due and owing at the
time of service of the writ of attachment. No jurisdiction, other than
Maryland, holds that there may be a right of set-off if maturity occurs
prior to trial.
Id. at 520-21, 224 A.2d at 429 (Barnes, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This right of set-off, however, cannot extend to any matter originating by the
garnishee's own conduct subsequent to the attachment. Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Franklin Bank, 31 Md. 404, 412-13 (1869). "[O]therwise it would be in the
power of the garnishee in a majority of cases to defeat the right of condemnation,
which should not, by any means, be allowed." Id. at 413.
18. See Roberts v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Md. 36, 39, 145 A. 220, 222 (1929) (" '[T]he
liability of the garnishee is to be ascertained ... from the date of the laying of the
process in [the garnishee's] hands to the time of the trial.' The execution of the writ
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are possessed by the debtor against the garnishee.' 9 Unless the garnishee
has actual 20 or constructive 2 1 possession of the debtor's property when
the writ of garnishment is served, the garnishee is not liable to the
creditor.
Courts view valid contracts with a degree of sanctity and will not
permit a garnishment to negate contract terms. Thus, garnishment cannot change a preexisting bona fide contract between the debtor and the
garnishee, 2 2 or between a third party and a garnishee. 23 If the garnishee's accountability for the debtor's property is removed or modified
by a preexisting bona fide contract, the garnishee's liability to the creditor is similarly removed or modified. 24 If the contract between the garnishee and debtor is not based upon bona fide consideration or is a mere
pretense for defrauding creditors, however, the garnishee's liability to the
25
creditor is unaffected.
The creditor has an inchoate lien on property or credits owned by
the debtor, but possessed by the garnishee, when the garnishee has been
served with a writ of garnishment. 26 In the majority of jurisdictions, the

19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

24.
25.
26.

placed the attaching creditor in the same position, with respect to the attached
rights and credits, which his debtor occupied.") (quoting International Bedding Co.
v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 492, 126 A. 902, 907 (1924)); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 300, 129 A. 660, 664 (1925).
Messall, 244 Md. at 506, 224 A.2d at 421. See also Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
204 Md. 450, 457, 105 A.2d 225, 227 (1954) ("[T]he rights of the [creditor] can
never rise above those of the [debtor]. If the [debtor] cannot sue the garnishee...
the [creditor] cannot do so."); Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 62324, 95 A.2d 273, 277 (1953). But see Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 445 (1878)
("There are some exceptions to this general rule, as for instance if the debtor has
fraudulently conveyed property to another, the grantee may be charged as garnishee, though the fraudulent grantor could not maintain a suit.").
Walsh v. Lewis Swimming Pool Constr., 256 Md. 608, 610, 261 A.2d 475, 476
(1970); Farley, 113 Md. at 385, 77 A. at 591-92.
Glenn v. Boston & Sandwich Glass Co., 7 Md. 287, 295-96 (1854). In Glenn, constructive possession was found to be in a trustee in bankruptcy. "Actual possession
of money or property on the part of the garnishee is not necessary to make an
attachment efficacious or operative, provided [the garnishee] has the legal right to
the possession and control, as in the cases of money deposited in the bank and the
like." Id.
See North Chicago Rolling-Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U.S. 596, 622
(1894) ("[W]hatever rights the garnishee may have under existing contracts with the
principal debtor, he is entitled to have the benefit thereof as against the attaching
creditor."); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Wheeler, 18 Md. 372, 379 (1862).
Farley, 113 Md. at 387, 77 A. at 592 ("[I]t is well settled that garnishment cannot
have the effect of changing the nature of a contract between the garnishee and the
defendant or preventing the garnishee from performing a contract with a third
person.")
See id.; Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 18 Md. at 379.
Farley, 113 Md. at 386-87, 77 A. at 592.
See Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 161, 411 A.2d 430, 437 (1980). The goods
or property belonging to the debtor and possessed by the garnishee are considered in
custodia legis, and the garnishee is bound to keep them safely. International Bedding Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 492, 126 A. 902, 906 (1924).
The garnishee has the duty to retain such goods or property for the benefit of the
creditor as against the debtor or any subsequent purchaser or pledgee, and the gar-
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garnishee's liability is fixed either when the writ of garnishment is served
or when the garnishee's answer must be filed. 27 The creditor's inchoate

lien on property or credits in the garnishee's possession can be perfected
only by a judgment of condemnation absolute. 28 Such a judgment constitutes a specific lien on the condemned property in the hands of the garnishee and relates back to the time when the writ of garnishment was
liability extends beyond
served. 29 In Maryland, however, the garnishee's
30
service of the writ until the judgment at trial.
Determining whether the garnishee possesses any property or credits belonging to the debtor has been called the "sole purpose" of a garnishment proceeding. 31 The practical result of garnishment is that the
property is merely impounded in the garnishee's possession and maintains its status quo until the underlying action in debt between the debtor
and creditor is determined. 32 The creditor must prove that the garnishee
'is either indebted to the debtor or has possession of the debtor's property

27.

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.

nishee is not at liberty to change such goods, convert them into money, or to exercise any act of ownership over them. Id. at 492, 126 A. at 906-07. The garnishee
must hold them until his liability to the debtor or any subsequent purchaser or
pledgee is determined. Id. at 492, 126 A. at 907.
See, e.g., Steiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 127 Ala. 595, 29 So. 65 (1900); Smith v.
Crocker First Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 152 Cal. App. 2d 832, 314 P.2d 237
(1957) ("Since the garnishment reaches only such debts as are owing to the defendant at the moment of garnishment subsequent debts or credits created thereafter in
good faith can be no concern of the attaching creditor."); Day v. Bank of Del Norte,
76 Colo. 223, 225, 230 P. 785, 786 (1924) ("The rights and liabilities of the garnishee are to be determined as of the date of the garnishment and not upon a state of
facts that existed theretofore or thereafter."); Anderson v. Keystone Chem. Supply
Co., 293 Ill. 468, 127 N.E. 668 (1920); Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502,
507, 224 A.2d 419, 421 (1966). See also C. DRAKE, supra note 12, § 667, at 598-99
(garnishee's liability restricted to defendant's effects or credits in his hands at the
date of garnishment and no later unless by statute).
See Rhodes & Williams v. Amsinck & Co., 38 Md. 345 (1873). For the meaning of
the term "judgment of condemnation absolute" and its legal effect, see Gribble v.
Stearman & Kaplan, Inc., 249 Md. 289, 294-95, 239 A.2d 573, 576 (1968) ("[A]
judgment of condemnation absolute in an attachment proceeding is a specific lien on
the condemned property in the hands of the garnishee, relating back to the time the
attachment was laid ....")(citing Rowan v. State, 172 Md. 190, 197, 191 A. 244,
248 (1937)). See also Overmyer v. Lawyers Title Ins., 32 Md. App. 177, 184, 359
A.2d 260, 265 (1976) ("[S]hould final judgment be obtained, the lien relates back to
the time when the property was attached and eliminates subsequent claims and liens
from priority.") (citing 4 J. POE, POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 556 (H. Sachs
6th ed. 1975)).
Rowan v. State, 172 Md. 190, 197, 191 A. 244, 248 (1937).
Fico, 287 Md. at 161, 411 A.2d at 437; see also InternationalBedding Co., 146 Md.
at 492, 126 A. at 907("[L]iability of the garnishee is to be ascertained by the value of
the defendant's property in his hands from the date of the laying of the process in
his hands to the time of the trial."); Glenn v. Boston & Sandwich Glass Co., 7 Md.
287, 296 (1854) ("[I]t has been the general practice under our attachment system ...
to condemn all credits or property in the hands of the garnishee of the debtor at the
time of the trial.").
Fico, 287 Md. at 159, 411 A.2d at 436; accord Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972).
Mendoza v. Acme Transfer & Storage, 66 N.M. 32, 35, 340 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1959).

1987]

Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co.

or credits. 33 Determining whether a garnishee has possession of property
depends, not upon agency principles of constructive
possession, but upon
34
principles of law consistent with garnishment.
To avoid garnishment, the garnishee must contest the condemnation
of the property or credit garnished. 35 There are several grounds for defense: (1) the attachment was issued irregularly, 36 (2) the property does
not belong to the debtor, 37 or (3) the garnishee is not indebted to the
debtor. 38 If the garnishee has permitted the property to be withdrawn
from his possession, a judgment in personam will be issued against him
for the value of the attached property if in fact the garnishee owed the
39
debtor property.
33. Lockerman v. Eastern Shore Trust Co., 146 Md. 330, 348, 126 A. 140, 146 (1924);
J. Cueva Co. v. R. Lancaster Williams & Co., 145 Md. 526, 529, 125 A. 849, 850
(1924).
As in other civil actions, when there is no substantial conflict in the evidence,
or when the evidence is such that only one conclusion reasonably can be drawn
therefrom, it is a question of law for the court to decide. See, e.g., Johnston v.
Western Md. Ry. Co., 151 Md. 422, 425, 135 A. 185, 187 (1926); Eastern Shore
Trust Co. v. Lockerman, 148 Md. 628, 129 A. 915 (1925); J. Cueva Co., 145 Md. at
529-30, 125 A. at 850-51.
34. See Escambia Chem. Corp. v. United Ins. Co. of America, 396 So. 2d 66 (Ala.
1981). In Escambia, a judgment creditor had a money judgment against an insurance agent of the garnishee insurance company. Id. at 67. After filing the writ of
garnishment, the debtor had collected premiums and remitted to his principal the
net amount due the company after deducting his commissions. The Escambia court
rejected the agency theory of constructive possession and held that there was no
garnishable debt because there was no liability on the part of the garnishee that
would enable the debtor to maintain an action at law against the garnishee and
recover a judgment. Id. at 68. But see Buckner v. Western Life Ins. Co., 382
S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). In Buckner, the garnishee was an insurance com-

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

pany that employed the judgment debtor as its agent to collect premiums from its
life insurance policyholders. Id. at 13. The debtor received as his fee a percentage
of the premiums he collected by deducting such fees from each collection and remitting only the remaining balance to the garnishee. In holding that such commissions
were subject to garnishment, the Court of Appeals of Missouri deferred to principles
of agency law, reasoning that, in essence, the debtor was withdrawing his commissions from the garnishee's cash drawer. Id. at 15-17.
See Gorn v. Kolker, 213 Md. 551, 553-54, 133 A.2d 65, 67 (1957).
See Lambden v. Bowie, 2 Md. 334, 338 (1852).
See id.
See Gorn, 213 Md. at 553, 133 A.2d at 67. A garnishee under an attachment issued
on a judgment, however, cannot attack the validity of the judgment or contest the
claim merged in the judgment. Id. at 553-54, 133 A.2d at 67.
International Bedding Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 492, 126 A.
902, 907 (1924). A judgment "in personam" is a judgment against a particular per-

son.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

758 (5th ed. 1979). If the property is in the pos-

session of the garnishee at the trial or judgment, there may be a condemnation
thereof and the action is in rem. InternationalBedding Co., 146 Md. at 492, 126 A.
at 907. A proceeding "in rem" is brought to enforce a right in specific property, and
a subsequent judgment operates directly upon that property. Hobbs v. Lenon, 191
Ark. 509, 519, 87 S.W.2d 6, 1t (1935).
Over 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that every state
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property within its territory. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). The Court later held that, because a state's
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The United States Supreme Court has held that valid contracts are
property. 40 A licensing contract was held attachable by the Court of Appeals of New York in Abkco Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc. 41 In
Abkco, a creditor sought to attach a debtor's interest in a licensing contract. 4 2 Under the terms of the contract, the debtor was to receive eighty
percent of the net profits from the promotion of a film. 4 3 When the order

of attachment was secured, no net profits had been generated and
whether such profits would in fact be forthcoming was uncertain. 44 The
court concluded that the debtor's interest in the contingency fee contract
"constituted property, composed of the bundle of all its rights under the
Agreement [and] that property was attachable because concededly it was
assignable .

. . . ",4-

By permitting the creditor to decide whether the

contingent nature of the asset is worth pursuing, Abkco gives greater sig-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

process could not reach beyond its borders, due process did not require any effort to
give a property owner personal notice that his property was involved in an in rem
proceeding. See, e.g., Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 327 (1890); Ballard v. Hunter,
204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907). During this early developmental stage of the notion of
due process, the Court also held that, when there is a state statute providing for the
attachment of debts or credits, and when a garnishee is served personally with process while visiting the creditor's state, the court acquires personal jurisdiction over
the garnishee, even though the debtor himself is not subject to that state's jurisdiction. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905). This holding, however, was limited
to states where the principal debtor could have sued the garnishee if he had obtained
personal jurisdiction over the garnishee in that state. Id. at 223. Cf. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620 (1916) (unless the plaintiff has obtained a
judgment establishing his claim against the principal defendant, his right to "represent" the principal defendant in an action against the garnishee is in issue).
Recently, the Supreme Court reversed the long-standing precedents established
by Pennoyer and Harris: the Court extended the application of the minimum contacts test, as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
to cases where jurisdiction formerly was based solely on the presence of the defendant's property within the forum state. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Shaffer precludes a court from exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction without first determining the sufficiency of the contacts between the forum state and the defendant.
Id. at 212. But the Court also noted that it "does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing
contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation." Id. at 207.
The Supreme Court also has ruled that due process requires a hearing prior to
attaching the defendant's property in order to secure the defendant's due process
rights with regard to his property. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Such a hearing also serves to ensure
that the attachment infringes none of the defendant's rights in the underlying dispute. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81. The court must disallow those attachments that are
unfair to the defendant or result from mistake. Id.
See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); North Texas Producers
Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962); Department of Financial Inst. v.
Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629 (1952).
39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
Abkco Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 672, 350 N.E.2d 899, 900,
385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (1976).
Id. at 673, 350 N.E.2d at 900, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
Id. at 674, 350 N.E.2d at 901, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
Id. at 674, 350 N.E.2d at 901, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 513-14. The court went on to state,
"We know of no threshold requirement that the attaching creditor show the value of
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nificance to the economic potential of an asset.46
In Maryland, "property" embraces everything that has exchangeable value or goes to make up a man's wealth, 4 7 including tangible and
intangible property of every kind. 48 Furthermore, an attaching judgment
49
creditor is permitted to garnish "any property of the judgment debtor."
Nevertheless, in Belcher v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,50 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an executory contract was not
attachable. In Belcher, the creditor attempted to attach an insurance contract owned by an absent defendant policyholder. 5 1 The creditor claimed
that the insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured defendant and to
provide a defense to a claim constituted an asset 52 within the definition of
Maryland's attachment statute. 53 The court rejected the creditor's claim

46.

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

the attached property or indeed that it has any value." Id. at 675, 350 N.E.2d at
902, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
D. SIEGEL, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5201, at 53-54
(McKinney 1978). Although the contingent nature of the "debt" would make it
unattachable, the judgment creditor is entitled to pursue it if he treats the asset as
"property." Id. at 54. "If the pursuit is undertaken and it comes to nothing, the
judgment creditor has wasted some time and effort and perhaps some money. If he
is willing to take the chance, the law should not stand in his way." Id. at 55.
Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 36, 209 A.2d 914, 915 (1965). But cf. Archer v.
Archer, 303 Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985) (husband's medical degree
not marital property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce).
MD. R. 1-202(u) ("Property includes real, personal, mixed, tangible or intangible
property of every kind."). See also Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d
767, 769 (1942) (construing "property" to include obligations, rights, and other intangibles as well as physical things); Schill v. Remington Putnam Co., 179 Md. 83,
90, 17 A.2d 175, 178 (1941) (characterizing "goodwill" as a legally protected and
valuable property right); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-101(p) (1974)
(" 'Property' includes both real and personal property, and any right or interest
therein.").
Similarly, other jurisdictions allow for a broad definition of "property." See,
e.g., Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1937)
(property includes accounts receivable); Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l
Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917) (" 'Property' is a term of very broad signification, embracing everything that has exchangeable value or goes to make up a man's
wealth .... "); City Stores Co. v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (property includes accounts receivable); Haldeman v. Haldeman, 202 Cal.
App. 2d 498, 21 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1962) ("A business is a type of property which is a
composite of tangible and intangible properties. Its tangibles will be its fixtures,
inventory of supplies and stock in trade, perhaps a building or leasehold, cash ....
accounts receivable and other personal property."); Standard Marine Ins. Co. v.
Board of Assessors, 123 La. 717, 720, 49 So. 483, 484 (1909) (property includes
outstanding uncollected accounts).
International Bedding Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 488, 126 A.
902, 905 (1924) (all lands, goods, rights and credits held to be subject to attachment
by garnishment).
282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978).
Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 719-20, 387 A.2d 770,
771 (1978).
Id. at 721-22, 387 A.2d at 772.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-302 (1984) reads:
A court of law including the District court, within the limits of its jurisdiction, may issue an attachment at the commencement of the action or while
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for four reasons. First, the obligation was contingent upon an independent event because it would arise only after a judgment was rendered
against the insured. 54 Second, the insurer's mere promise to defend the
insured was by itself an insufficient basis to furnish jurisdiction over the
matter.5 5 Third, the insurance policy created an obligation to provide 56a
personal service that was nontransferable; therefore, not attachable.
it is pending against any property or credits, whether matured or unmatured, belonging to the debtor upon the application of the plaintiff in the
action.
54. Belcher, 282 Md. at 725, 387 A.2d at 774. The court stated, "Determinative of our
conclusion in this case ... is the long-established principle that where an interest is
uncertain and contingent - in that it may never become due and payable - it is
not subject to attachment ..
" Id. at 723, 387 A.2d at 773 (footnotes omitted).
The court drew a distinction between a contingent interest and one that is, although
unmatured, still subject to attachment. With a contingent interest, liability is
neither certain nor absolute, but depends on some independent event. With an unmatured interest, the amount of the garnishee's liability may be somewhat uncertain, but there is no question about the fact of liability. Id. at 724 n.3, 387 A.2d at
774 n.3. See also Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 640, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768,
777 (1976) ("A distinction exists between situations where only the amount of liability is uncertain and those where the fact of liability is uncertain.") But see Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (an insurer's duty to
defend and indemnify becomes a "debt" within the meaning of New York attachment statutes as soon as the accident occurs).
55. Belcher, 282 Md. at 725, 387 A.2d at 774. After attempts to obtain personal service
of process upon the insured had failed, the summons was returned non est. Id. at
719-20, 387 A.2d at 771. The court labeled the plaintiff's subsequent attempt to
obtain jurisdiction over the action a "bootstrap approach" because the insurer's
duty to defend would "not arise unless and until litigation [was] properly instituted
against the insured with service of process upon him requiring him to respond." Id.
at 725, 387 A.2d at 774. The court concluded that, to grant jurisdiction in such
circumstances would be "a classic example of the tail wagging the dog, a bit of
wizardry in which we decline to engage." Id. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775.
56. Id. at 725 n.4, 387 A.2d at 774 n.4 ("The policy creates an obligation to provide
personal services; that obligation, being personal, is not transferable and consequently not attachable.") (citing Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 646, 131
Cal. Rptr. 768, 780 (1976)). For the proposition that personal services are not attachable in a garnishment case, see Comment, Quasi In Rem JurisdictionBased ol
Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654, 655-56 (1967). An insurer's duty to
defend an insured was discussed in the context of the garnishment form of
attachment:
[I]t does not necessarily follow that the obligation to defend is attachable
since the concept of a 'debt' within the meaning of the statute may be
limited to money debts. Although the New York courts have never been
called upon to answer the question, the general rule is that obligations
payable in services rather than in money cannot be attached.
Comment, supra, at 655 (citing Mims v. Parker, I Ala. 421 (1840)). The author
explained the rationale for the rule: "courts have no right to interfere with the
contracts between parties, and to make one party pay money when by the terms of
his contract he has agreed to pay, and the other party has agreed to receive something else." Comment, supra, at 655-56 (quoting Weil v. C.H. Tyler & Co., 38 Mo.
545, 546-47 (1866)).
This analysis is still valid in the context of the garnishment variety of attachment, wherein the attaching creditor attempts to force the garnishee to perform
personal services for the benefit of the creditor rather than for the benefit of the
judgment debtor. This would indeed constitute involuntary servitude. A personal
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Fourth, the valuation of such a contractual duty to defend was "a practical impossibility, for its true worth can be determined only at the end of
the litigation, at which point the obligation ceases to exist because it has
been fulfilled, leaving no other res that can be attached. ' 57 Although the
executory contract was held not attachable, the decision is tailored to the
particular facts of the case.
In Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co.,58 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland recognized that garnishment was not intended to change the
relationship between a garnishee and a debtor pursuant to a bona fide
contract. 59 A creditor's rights against the garnishee are the same as
those held by the debtor. 60 The court reasoned, "The judgment creditor,
therefore, stands in [the attorney's] shoes; his rights are not superior to,
but the same as the debtor's."' 6 1 Liability depends upon whether the garnishee has possession of property or credits belonging to the debtor for
which the debtor would have the right to sue, 6 2 possession need not be
actual. 63 Based upon the terms of the contingency contract between the
doctor and the attorney, the attorney could not have sued the doctor
because the doctor had no property belonging to the attorney for which
the attorney could sue. 64 Furthermore, the court observed that remitting
only that amount owed to the doctor, decreased by a deduction for the
65
attorney's services, did not make the contingent fee contract improper.
Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's
summary judgment
66
for the creditor and held in favor of the doctor.
Cocco is a sound decision based on prior case law. It has long been
held in Maryland that the test of a garnishee's liability is whether the
debtor would be able to successfully maintain a suit against the garnishee. 67 In Cocco, the debtor had no such cause of action by which he
could recover a judgment from the garnishee; according to the terms of

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

services contract, however, has been held to be attachable as property in the hands
of the debtor for the creditor's benefit. See Abkco Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc.,
39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976). See supra notes 40-48
and accompanying text.
Belcher, 282 Md. at 725 n.4, 387 A.2d at 774 n.4.
69 Md. App. 68, 516 A.2d 596 (1986).
Cocco v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 69 Md. App. 68, 73, 516 A.2d 596, 599 (1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74, 516 A.2d at 599.
Id. at 71, 516 A.2d at 598. The court acknowledged that the attorney was the
garnishee's agent. Id. at 73, 516 A.2d at 599. Notwithstanding, the court rejected
Buckner v. Western Life Ins. Co., 382 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), wherein the
Court of Appeals of Missouri held that, because an agent's possession is possession
by the principal, payments to the agent are in law payments to the principal and
therefore subject to garnishment. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 74, 516 A.2d at 599.
Id. at 73, 516 A.2d at 598. The court found nothing in the record that would in any
way suggest that the agreement between the doctor and the attorney was collusive
or was designed to defraud creditors. Id. at 73, 516 A.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 74, 516 A.2d at 599.
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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the preexisting contingency contract between the debtor and garnishee,
68
the garnishee never had possession of monies or credits due the debtor.
If, by agreement or established practice, the attorney forwarded the entire sums collected to the doctor and the doctor periodically reimbursed
the attorney for his services, the doctor would have been subject to the
creditor's garnishment to the extent of the sums forwarded between service of the garnishment writ and trial. In such a case, the doctor69 as
garnishee is in possession of "property or credits" due the attorney.
In Cocco, the judgment creditor's pleadings narrowly restricted
"property" to include only the debt owed by the doctor to the attorney. 70
A contract was created between the doctor and the attorney. 7' Additionally, the contract in Cocco was similar to that found in Abkco, where the
Court of Appeals of New York permitted a creditor to attach an execu72
tory contingent fee contract as property in the debtor's possession.
Notwithstanding, the judgment creditor in Cocco ignored the possible
remedy of attaching the property rights in the attorney's possession, that
is, the bundle of rights inherent in his contract with the doctor.
Furthermore, the obstacles to the attachment of an executory personal services contract cited in Belcher 73 are absent in Cocco. First,
performance of the collection contract between the doctor and the attorney was not contingent upon any independent event. Rather, its value as
property was merely unmatured. 74 Second, due process would have
been upheld because the attorney was a Maryland resident served with
process. 75 Third, valuation of the contract would not have been a "practical impossibility" because the selling of accounts receivables is a com76
monplace commercial practice, subject to reasonable estimation.
Fourth, although the contract was one for personal services, the attachment of the contract as property in the debtor's possession would not
contravene the policy against garnishing such a contract as a debt in the
garnishee's hands. 77 The nature of the contract's quid pro quo would not

be changed by such an attachment because, in any event, the doctor
would receive a fungible item - money. The only change that such an
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 73, 516 A.2d at 599.
See supra note 12.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Cocco, 69 Md. App. at 69, 516 A.2d at 597.
Abkco Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 350
N.E.2d 899 (1976). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). See
supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of contingent versus unmatured contracts, see supra note 54.
For a discussion of due process in attachment and garnishment proceedings, see
supra note 39.
1. NAITOVE, MODERN FACTORING 18 (1976) ("Factoring is the outright sale of
accounts receivable without recourse. The factor assumes the credit risk and handles all details of collection."). For a general discussion on the subject, see C.
PHELPS, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
NANCE (1st ed. 1957).

FINANCING AS A METHOD OF BUSINESS FI-

77. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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attachment would effect would be substitution of the creditor for the
debtor as the recipient of the balance of the monies collected. Indeed, by
the terms of the contract, no personal service was ever owed by the attorney to the doctor. Rather, the essence of the contract was that upon the
occurrence of an uncertain future event - the collection of money - a
definite portion of the money would accrue to the doctor. Thus, the doctor did not expect to receive personal services, he expected to receive
money.
A valid contract can be property subject to attachment even though
it may entail personal services. Nevertheless, a creditor attaching an executory contract for personal services will have to expend effort fulfilling
the contract to exact a realization of an economic benefit from the attachment. In deciding whether to attach the contract, the attaching creditor
must consider whether it has the expertise to perform the services called
the time and expense necessary to acquire
for in the contract as well as 78
attachment.
the
of
decree
the
Cocco is consistent with prior case law. If the creditor had not chosen garnishment as its remedy, but rather attachment, the creditor may
have been more successful. In addition, a decision enforcing an attachment on the contract in Cocco would have been consistent with Belcher.
The creditor, however, must weigh carefully the economic viability of
attaching an executory contract. When a debtor is a party to a potentially valuable contingency fee contract, judgment creditors should not
attempt to garnish the proceeds from the contract, but pursue an attachment of the contract.
James E. Urmin

78. If the attaching creditor in Cocco did not itself possess the necessary expertise to act
competently as a collection agent for the doctor, it could have subcontracted the job
to another specialist on a contingency fee basis, thereby still retaining a percentage
of any proceeds. The attorney in Cocco derived an economic benefit from his contract after attachment of $3,645.84. See supra note 6.

